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Introduction 
Consider this hypothetical:  a suspect is arrested for burglary.  His 
DNA sample is entered into state and national DNA databases and it 
matches a DNA sample found at the scene of a rape.  The rape occurred 
twenty years ago and cannot be prosecuted due to the statute of limitations 
in that jurisdiction.  States, such as Texas, have mandated that these DNA 
matches to prior unadjudicated crimes be attached to a suspect’s criminal 
record.1  In turn, at sentencing, a court may seek to use the rape DNA match 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 2011; 
B.A. Washington and Lee University, June 2006.  I wish to thank Professor J.D. King for his 
guidance on this endeavor, as well as my family and friends for their support throughout the 
process. 
 1. See H.B. 2932, 2009 Leg., 81st Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009) (codified at TEX. GOV’T 
CODE § 411.0602) ("[T]he bureau of identification and records shall establish and maintain a 
268 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 267 (2010) 
to heighten the penalty of defendant’s burglary conviction.2  The statute 
attempts to hold criminals accountable for their actions and to provide 
victims some semblance of closure when a case can never be tried.3  
Nonetheless, when no jury has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant actually committed the rape crime and the DNA match stands 
alone as evidence of the extraneous offense, there must be procedural 
safeguards at the sentencing stage to be sure the evidence sufficiently 
satisfies a defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process rights and Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury.4 
The line of Supreme Court cases following Apprendi v. New Jersey,5 
recognizes that limits, although minimal, exist at sentencing.6  Apprendi 
requires that any additional facts that enhance punishment above the 
                                                                                                                 
central index to collect and disseminate information regarding additional offenses that 
forensic DNA test results indicate may have been committed by a defendant who has been 
arrested for or charged with any felony . . . ."). 
 2. See VAUGHT ET AL., HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION BILL 
ANALYSIS:  RECORDING DNA TESTS FOR PRIOR FELONIES IN CRIMINAL HISTORY FILES 3 
(2009), http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/pdf/ba81r/hb2932.pdf ("The information from the 
database match could be introduced as additional evidence in the punishment phase of trial 
when the person is convicted of another offense."). 
 3. See Ann Zimmerman, Links to Sex Crimes to Follow Texas Suspects, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 31, 2009, at A3 ("Women [who have survived rape] want the men to be held 
accountable in some way."). 
 4. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that defendants have constitutional due 
process rights requiring DNA matching to pass verification equivalent to a preponderance of 
the evidence standard). 
 5. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"). In Apprendi, the Court considered whether 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination 
prompting an increase in the maximum penalty for a crime be made by a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 469.  The Court determined that a criminal defendant is 
entitled to a jury determination that he is guilty of every element beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id. at 477.  Practice must adhere to the basic principles requiring that the jury consider each 
relevant fact beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 483–84.  The Court determined that a 
criminal defendant will suffer loss of liberty if he is punished beyond the sentence provided 
by statute under certain circumstances and not under others.  Id. at 484.  Applying these 
principles, the Court held that any fact raising the penalty above the statutory maximum 
must be proved by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 490.  Thus, the Court invalidated 
a New Jersey statute allowing judicial fact-finding on whether a hate-crime was committed 
with a purpose to intimidate to raise a sentence from ten years to twenty.  Id. at 497. 
 6. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299–302 (2004) (applying 
Apprendi to a case in which the judge found the defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty" 
under a state statute); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243–44 (2005) 
(reaffirming Apprendi with regards to the federal sentencing guidelines). 
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prescribed statutory maximum for the underlying offense must be tried by a 
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.7  In some states, additional 
facts like DNA matches to extraneous unadjudicated offenses will have 
little significance on a defendant’s final sentence with regards to the 
Apprendi decision, because the sentencing guidelines leave little room for 
departures above or below the underlying offense.8  The legislature in those 
states sets out each offense and its specific corresponding punishment.9  An 
unexpected judicial departure would meet with disapproval.10  In contrast, 
the constitutional limitations of Apprendi will have a greater impact on the 
proposed hypothetical in states with broad sentencing ranges that give 
judges broad discretion to consider factors aside from the underlying 
offense.11  Apprendi would never be triggered under those systems, 
although the admission of DNA evidence could have a substantial impact 
on the length of the sentence, because the additional evidence never brings 
the sentence near the statutory maximum.12 
If convictions based on DNA evidence alone were always reliable 
beyond a reasonable doubt, using DNA matches at trial or in the sentencing 
process would not raise constitutional questions.13  However, that is not yet 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (protecting a defendant’s right to a jury trial and 
reinforcing the government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 8.  See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines:  Diversity Consensus, 
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1219–20 (2005) (explaining that states 
devoted to greater uniformity and higher compliance rates use nonvoluntary systems with 
"formal enforcement mechanisms" which may reduce judicial flexibility). 
 9. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY:  THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA, at ix (Oxford University Press, Inc. 2001) ("What 
sets California’s law apart from the other Three Strikes laws and every other penal law 
innovation of recent times is the extremity of its terms and the revolutionary nature of its 
ambitions."). 
 10. See id. (reviewing different mechanisms to discourage judges from departing from 
the guidelines). 
 11. See id. at 1202 (explaining that indeterminate sentencing systems can create a 
wide disparity in lengths of sentences and that systems based on theories of recidivism may 
put more emphasis on offender characteristics than the underlying offense); see also 
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949) ("New York criminal statutes set wide 
limits for maximum and minimum sentences.  Under New York statutes a state judge cannot 
escape his grave responsibility of fixing sentence."). 
 12. See, e.g., Frase, supra note 8, at 1192–93 (explaining that some states may choose 
to implement "voluntary" regimes to allow greater judicial discretion while others do not 
even require judges to explain departures from the suggested sentencing guidelines); see also 
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (explaining that it is permissible for a 
judge to rely on facts outside the trial record in determining whether to sentence a defendant 
to death when the state has an indeterminate sentencing regime). 
 13. See Brooke G. Malcom, Convictions Predicated on DNA Evidence Alone:  How 
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the case.14  Despite the growing use of DNA at trial, the weight to accord it 
still remains a point of contention, especially when the DNA serves as the 
sole evidence.15  In a few rare cases, DNA has been found sufficient to 
convict without corroborating evidence.16  Nonetheless, courts, rightfully, 
remain cautious in placing too much weight on DNA matches alone to 
convict.17  Courts and scholars worry that juries will not know how to 
weigh statistical information or will unreasonably rely on science because it 
appears infallible.18  DNA’s reputation has progressed as the ultimate 
crime-solver in legal television shows and literature.19  Other concerns 
include the reliability of new methodologies used, privacy rights, human 
error, and fraud.20  As a result of this mistrust, experts and analysts testify at 
trial to the use of DNA and its reliability, or lack thereof.21  Scholars argue 
over whether DNA evidence, alone, can ever prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.22  One scholar suggests that courts establish a threshold 
                                                                                                                 
Reliable Evidence Became Infallible, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 315 (2008) ("One central 
concern is whether these decisions [made based solely on DNA evidence] conflict with the 
requirement of guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
 14. See id. (pointing out that DNA testing has not been proven to be reliable beyond a 
reasonable doubt). 
 15. See id. ("DNA testing itself remains controversial."). 
 16. See, e.g., People v. Rush, 630 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding 
that "the testimony of even one DNA expert that there is a genetic match between the semen 
recovered from the victim of a rape and the blood of the defendant . . . is legally sufficient to 
support a guilty verdict"); State v. Toomes, 191 S.W.3d 122, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) 
(holding that DNA evidence admitted without other corroborating evidence was sufficient to 
support a conviction for aggravated rape); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 172 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2000) (holding that DNA is sufficient to form the sole basis of a conviction for 
sexual assault). 
 17. See Malcom, supra note 13, at 315 ("A major concern, which will be examined in 
this paper, is whether the significance of DNA has been overestimated by courts and 
jurors."). 
 18. See id. at 315–16 (noting concerns that stem from a conviction based solely on 
DNA evidence). 
 19. See, e.g., Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Forensic Science Challenges for Trial Judges, 
18 WIDENER L.J. 309, 376 (2009) (reexamining the reasons for the "CSI effect" of jurors’ 
raised expectations at trial today and including the effects of all technology available to 
jurors on a day-to-day basis). 
 20. See id. at 376–77 (identifying the weaknesses in DNA evidence). 
 21. See Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers?:  Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to 
Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1138 (2010) (explaining that the prosecution calls 
serologists, analysts, and other technicians to validate the chain of custody and to present the 
evidence). 
 22. See Malcom, supra note 13, at 315 (emphasizing the complexity of DNA evidence 
and the conflicting view points regarding its admissibility). 
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for admissibility of DNA evidence that is no less favorable to the defendant 
than a 1 in 1,000 chance that the defendant is not the source of the DNA.23  
She argues that this standard satisfies the defendant’s due process right not 
to be tried on insufficient evidence.24  Such a determination becomes 
necessary as courts and jurors rely more heavily upon DNA at trial.25 
Similar questions necessarily surface regarding the standard of proof 
and admissibility of DNA evidence at sentencing.26  DNA, more so than 
other sentencing factors, runs the risk of being overly-persuasive when 
introduced at sentencing because its reliability stems from scientific 
analysis, less likely to be challenged by a jury or a judge.27  In addition, if 
the prosecution provides no witness testimony, a judge cannot weigh the 
DNA’s reliability, except to take it as fact.28  If other evidence is produced 
at sentencing, such as eyewitness testimony to an extraneous offense, the 
judge can more easily weigh its credibility.29  Determining how certain a 
court must be that a defendant committed the prior offense connected to the 
DNA when there exists no corroborating evidence remains unanswered.30 
This Note contemplates that in light of Apprendi and its progeny, a 
DNA database match should be viewed as an additional fact that must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury if enhancing the punishment 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.  And in states with wide 
sentencing ranges, DNA evidence of an unadjudicated crime must meet at 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1173 ("[M]ost people will not reach an actual belief in 
culpability below a 99.9% chance of culpability, or, equivalently, a 1 in 1,000 chance that 
the defendant is not culpable."). 
 24. See Malcom, supra note 13, at 323 (explaining that a judge weighing the 
admissibility of evidence must decide whether a rational juror could reach a finding of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise grant a motion for acquittal). 
 25. See Shelton, supra note 19, at 376 (discussing the increase in reliance on DNA 
evidence at trial and its relation to jurors expectations of how trials are conducted). 
 26. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing the difficulties that arise in determining 
the standard of proof that should apply to DNA evidence). 
 27. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1133 ("Because of their starkly numerical nature, their 
tantalizing offer of—‘near certain’ [proof of identity in some cases]—and the daunting 
complexity of the statistics involved, pure cold hit cases invite a new conversation about 
several fundamental issues of criminal procedure and evidence law." (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 28. See discussion infra Part II.B (raising concerns about the legitimacy of verdicts 
determined solely on the basis of DNA evidence). 
 29. See id. (discussing the increase in cases determined solely on the basis of DNA 
evidence). 
 30. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing the admission and evaluation of DNA 
evidence). 
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least a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to assure a 
defendant’s right not to be sentenced with insufficient evidence.31  Part I 
outlines the changes in sentencing jurisprudence since Apprendi and the 
Court’s recognition that constitutional rights of defendants exist at 
sentencing.  Part II.A introduces the standards of DNA admission at trial as 
a starting point for finding appropriate evidentiary limitations on DNA 
admission at sentencing.  Part II.B examines the limited precedent available 
on using DNA evidence alone to convict and proposes that doing so 
requires an initial finding of a DNA random match probability of 1 in 
1,000.32  Part III contends that a defendant continues to have constitutional 
due process rights at sentencing which require DNA matches to 
unadjudicated offenses pass a process of reliability verification, equivalent 
to at least a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
I.  The Changing Scope of Sentencing Jurisprudence 
Sentencing began as a predetermined act based solely on the 
offense charged.33  At common law, judges had very little discretion 
over sentencing.34  The law provided the applicable punishment for each 
specific offense, with no possible alterations.35  Since the nineteenth 
century, judges have gained wide latitude to sentence within statutory 
ranges.36  During the 1970s, indeterminate sentencing reigned and 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that DNA evidence must meet a 
preponderance of the evidence standard to avoid infringing on the defendant’s right to due 
process). 
 32. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1155 (proposing that an identifiable numerical 
threshold be established at which the source probability that the DNA belongs to defendant 
becomes high enough to assure a juror beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 33. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S 466, 478 (2000) (suggesting that indictments 
at common law were so precise as to the facts that the defendant knew exactly what his 
judgment would be from the offense outlined).  But see Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew 
Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 51 n.12 
(recognizing there remains some dispute over the early history of sentencing in the United 
States). 
 34. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 34, at 51 ("A judge ordinarily did not conduct a 
separate sentencing proceeding following a defendant’s conviction . . . ."). 
 35. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 ("The defendant’s ability to predict with certainty 
the judgment from the face of the felony indictment flowed from the invariable linkage of 
punishment with crime."). 
 36. See id. at 481–82 ("[J]udges in this country have long exercised discretion . . . in 
imposing [a] sentence within statutory limits in the individual case." (citing Williams v. New 
York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949))). 
THE AFFECTS OF APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY 273 
judicial sentencing expanded so much so that appellate review of 
sentencing virtually disappeared and the disparity of sentencing between 
criminals of the same crime became incomprehensible.37  Judges 
weighed the character of the defendant, along with any other 
information deemed relevant by the judge’s experience, judgment and 
"wisdom."38  Correctional officers also played a large role in 
determining when a defendant had been "rehabilitated."39  At the same 
time, jury findings lost significance while sentencing enhancements 
prescribed by the judge gained importance.40 
The supporters of indeterminate sentencing lost steam in the late 
1970s when the goals of individualized sentencing failed.41  First, 
recidivism had not significantly decreased.42  Second, its application 
allowed disparate sentences for different defendants guilty of the same 
crime, often resulting in discrimination of minorities.43   To appease the 
rising discontent with indeterminate sentencing, Congress enacted the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, implementing mandatory sentencing 
guidelines.44  The Act required that federal judges impose sentences 
within the applicable guideline range, unless an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance existed that had not adequately been considered 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See, e.g., William G. Otis, From Apprendi to Booker to Gall and Kimbrough:  The 
Supreme Court Blunders Its Way Back to Luck-of-the-Draw Sentencing, ENGAGE, June 2008, 
at 37 (referring to the 1983 Senate Report accompanying the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, which recognized that two offenders of similar offenses could receive widely different 
prison release dates). 
 38. See William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 
373, 378 (1995) ("Thus judicial decision-making remained the hallmark of our system of 
justice under this new sentencing system."). 
 39. See id. ("[C]orrectional officers were given the ultimate authority to determine 
when the offender was sufficiently rehabilitated to merit release or parole."). 
 40. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236 (2005) ("It became the judge, not 
the jury, who determined the upper limits of sentencing, and the facts determined were not 
required to be raised before trial or proved by more than a preponderance."). 
 41. See discussion infra Part I (enumerating the failures of individualized sentencing). 
 42. See Rose Duffy, The Return of Judicial Discretion, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 223, 227 
(2008) ("The indeterminate system did not seem to be curing defendants, at least based on 
recidivism rates." (internal citations omitted)). 
 43. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law:  An Opinionated Review, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 943, 979 (1999) (presenting the evolution of indeterminate sentencing); see 
also  S. REP. NO. 97-307, at 5 (1981) (noting the wide range of sentences to offenders 
convicted of similar crimes). 
 44. See Otis, supra note 37, at 37 (implementing a system of sentencing with appellate 
review). 
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by the United States Sentencing Commission.45  The Guidelines also 
abolished parole.46  Other states had also enacted determinate sentencing 
statutes commanding imposition of a specific sentence for each major 
felony.47 
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided McMillan v. Pennsylvania,48 in 
which the petitioners, convicted of felonies, argued that the visible 
possession of a firearm constituted an element of the underlying crime 
and had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.49  At the time, 
Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act50 provided that 
anyone convicted of certain enumerated felonies was subject to a 
minimum mandatory sentence of five years if the sentencing judge 
found by a preponderance of evidence that the person possessed a 
firearm.51  The Court deferred to this decision by the Pennsylvania 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF 
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 1 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter Booker 
Report] (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), excised by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005)). 
 46. See id. at 2 (deciding that parole was based on inconsistent beliefs regarding 
prisoner rehabilitation); see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the 
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 39 (1988) (discussing the 
replacement of parole with supervised release). 
 47. See Kadish, supra note 43, at 980–81 (referencing California’s legislature, which 
passed a determinate sentencing system in 1976). 
 48. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (holding that a 
Pennsylvania statute allowing a preponderance of the evidence standard met the due process 
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment).  In McMillan, the Court considered the legality 
of a Pennsylvania statute imposing a minimum sentence of five years for cases in which, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the crime.  
Id. at 81.  The Court reasoned that the state’s statute came into play only after the criminal 
defendant had been found guilty of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 85–86.  
Therefore, the statute does not change the maximum penalty for the underlying crime, nor 
does it create a distinct offense with a separate sentence; it simply limits the judge’s 
discretion in sentencing.  Id. at 88.  Applying this reasoning to the case at hand, the Court 
upheld the statute, determining that the statutory standard, preponderance of the evidence, 
satisfies the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 91. 
 49. Id. at 83 (upholding the reasonable-doubt standard according to the due process 
clause (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684, 703 (1975))).  
 50. See Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 PA. CONST. STAT. § 9712 (1982) 
(providing that those convicted of certain felonies are subject to mandatory minimum 
sentences if the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person possessed a 
firearm during commission of the crime). 
 51. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–86 ("[T]he Pennsylvania Legislature has expressly 
provided that visible possession of a firearm is not an element of the crimes enumerated in 
the mandatory sentencing statute . . . ."). 
THE AFFECTS OF APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY 275 
legislature to make visible possession of a firearm a sentencing factor as 
opposed to an element of the crime.52  In addition, the Court upheld a 
judge’s ability to make a finding of fact based on a preponderance of the 
evidence when it raised only the minimum sentence.53 
The faith placed in the federal guidelines’ ability to conform 
criminal sentencing did not last long.54  In 2000, Apprendi v. New Jersey 
acted as the turning point in recent sentencing jurisprudence by 
effectively ending determinate sentencing.55  Judicial fact-finding had, 
up to that point, been firmly grounded in precedent, however Apprendi 
began to chip away at that foundation.56  In Apprendi, the Supreme 
Court reviewed whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires "a factual determination authorizing an increase in 
the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be 
made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."57  The 
Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment required proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt for any additional fact introduced at sentencing that 
would raise the punishment above the statutory maximum.58 
Defendant, Apprendi, pleaded guilty to two counts of second-
degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of 
third-degree unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon.59  At 
sentencing the two counts of second-degree possession added up to 
twenty years in aggregate and the third-degree offense was to run 
concurrently.60  At sentencing, the main question remained whether his 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See id. at 90 (discussing the toleration of a wide variety of state sentencing 
procedures as a result of federalism). 
 53. See id. at 89 (noting that Pennsylvania’s statute limits the use of a preponderance 
of the evidence standard to trial judges deciding to raise minimum sentences); see also 
Douglas A. Berman, Editor’s Observations:  Assessing Apprendi’s Aftermath, 15 FED. 
SENTENCING. R. 75, 75 (2003) ("[F]acts which trigger mandatory minimum sentences can be 
found by a judge based on a preponderance standard of proof."). 
 54. See discussion infra Part I ("Judicial fact-finding had, up to that point, been firmly 
grounded in precedent, however Apprendi began to chip away at that foundation."). 
 55. See Otis, supra note 37, at 37 ("The brief and promising life of determinate 
sentencing had come to an end."). 
 56. See Booker Report, supra note 45, at 9 ("Apprendi was one of a series of cases 
challenging under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution judicial fact-finding when 
imposing sentences."). 
 57. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000). 
 58. See id. at 476 (discussing the defendant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
 59. See id. at 469–70 (summarizing the facts of the case). 
 60. See id. (stating the trial judge’s sentencing decision). 
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purpose in the shooting was racially biased and thus, a hate crime.61  If 
so, the court had the power to sentence Apprendi to a maximum of 
twenty additional years in prison.62  In the end, the trial judge found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the crime was motivated by racial 
bias and enhanced Apprendi’s sentence twelve years on that finding.63  
Apprendi appealed on the grounds "that the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution requires that the finding of bias upon which 
his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt."64  The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of 
New Jersey, as well as the New Jersey Supreme Court, upheld the 
enhanced sentence by viewing the judge’s finding as a "sentencing 
factor," as opposed to an element of the underlying crime.65 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reversed the lower 
courts,66 relying upon Jones v. United States.67  Jones noted that "‘under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury 
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior 
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be 
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See id. at 470–71 (pointing out that the issue remained whether the defendant’s 
crime was racially motivated). 
 62. See id. at 470 (stating that the maximum sentence for a racially motivated hate 
crime alone would be twenty years). 
 63. See id. at 471 (affirming the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s crime was 
racially motivated, warranting an enhanced sentence). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. (affirming lower court decisions holding that the trial judge’s enhanced 
sentence did not violate the Due Process Clause). 
 66. See id. at 497 ("The New Jersey procedure challenged in this case is an 
unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal 
justice system."). 
 67. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251–52 (1999) (invalidating the lower 
court’s interpretation of a federal carjacking statute and construing the statute as establishing 
three separate offenses that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).  In Jones, the Court 
considered whether a federal carjacking statute enumerated three separate crimes or one 
crime with three possible maximum penalties, two of which depended "on sentencing factors 
exempt from the requirements of charge or jury verdict."  Id. at 229.  The Court determined 
that a fact is an element of a crime, not a sentencing consideration.  Id. at 232.  The Court 
explained that facts must meet due process requirements, including an indictment charge, a 
jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id.  Based on the language of the statute, the 
Court determined that Congress intended that serious bodily harm be an element of the crime 
of aggravated carjacking.  Id. at 236.  The Court ultimately decided that the statute was 
comprised of three separate offenses, each with distinct elements requiring indictment, proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt and trial by jury.  Id. at 252. 
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reasonable doubt.’"68  Jones had been based on a federal statute, and the 
Court extended the same reasoning to New Jersey’s state statute under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.69  The Court rejected the idea "that the hate 
crime statute’s ‘purpose to intimidate’ was simply an inquiry into 
‘motive.’"70  Rather, it was an element of the entire offense never found 
by the jury.71  According to Apprendi, the statutory maximum is "the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."72  In sum, the 
Apprendi Court endorsed the finding in Jones that "it is unconstitutional 
for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that 
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant 
is exposed.  It is equally clear that such facts must be established by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt."73 
Apprendi held strong in Blakely v. Washington,74 which supported 
the "longstanding precedent . . . to give intelligible content to the right 
of jury trial. . . . [A] fundamental reservation of power in our 
constitutional structure."75  Within the same year, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 
243). 
 69. See id. at 476 ("The Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this 
case involving a state statute."). 
 70. Id. at 492. 
 71. See id. (arguing that the statute in question requires that the jury examine the 
defendant’s state of mind). 
 72. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (holding that the state trial 
court’s sentencing violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial based on the 
fact that the sentencing judge added time to his sentence after concluding that the defendant 
acted with deliberate cruelty). 
 73. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252–53 
(1999) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 74. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304 (holding that the state’s sentencing procedure was 
unconstitutional because it imposed a sentence based on facts not entered in Defendant’s 
guilty plea and not found by a jury). In Blakely, the Court considered whether a ninety-day 
sentence based on the belief that the crime was committed with "deliberate cruelty" violated 
the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.  Id. at 298.  The Court stated that 
the statutory maximum sentence is the maximum that may be imposed based solely on the 
facts revealed in a jury verdict or in a defendant’s own admission.  Id. at 303.  In this case, 
the facts supporting the Court’s finding of deliberate cruelty were not submitted to a jury, 
nor did the petitioner admit them in his statement.  Id.  Thus, the facts in the plea alone were 
not sufficient to warrant the imposed ninety-day sentence.  Id. at 304.  In light of the record, 
the Court found that the State’s sentencing procedure violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment 
rights.  Id. at 313. 
 75. Id. at 305. 
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decided United States v. Booker,76 declaring the federal sentencing 
guidelines unconstitutional as inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment.77  
The sentencing guidelines had improperly ordered a judge to enhance 
Booker’s sentence according to facts not found by a jury.78  The Court 
upheld the longstanding belief that the jury stands as a protection of the 
people from "judicial despotism."79  As a result the federal sentencing 
guidelines became advisory as opposed to mandatory.80  In order to 
preserve the majority of the guidelines, the Court excised the 
unconstitutional provisions from the Sentencing Reform Act.81 
 Gall v. United States82 and Kimbrough v. United States,83 both 
decided on the same day, solidified the advisory nature of the guidelines 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (reaffirming the holding in 
Apprendi that "any fact . . . which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the 
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a guilty verdict must be 
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury"). In Booker, the Court considered whether the 
application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment 
rights.  Id. at 226.  In this case, the petitioner received a substantially longer sentence based 
on a judge’s finding of fact by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 227.   Had the judge 
imposed the penalty based on the jury’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt, the petitioner 
would not have been subject to a substantially shorter sentence.  Id.  The Court determined 
that a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, there is 
proof that he committed every fact with which he is charged.  Id. at 230.  Because the 
Guidelines in question are mandatory and not advisory, the Court concluded that any fact 
which is required to impose a sentence exceeding the maximum must be authorized by the 
defendant’s own admission or by a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 
244. 
 77. See id. (holding that the Guidelines violate Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights). 
 78. See id. (stating that the right to a jury trial outweighs any tactics to conclude trials 
swiftly, including judicial fact-finding). 
 79. See id. at 238 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. 
Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 80. See id. at 245 (making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory in light of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 991 et 
seq.). 
 81. See id. at 245 (severing and excising the incompatible portions of the Guidelines); 
see also Otis, supra note 37, at 40 (classifying this decision as the death of determinate 
sentencing and stating that the "new, voluntary regime amounted to ‘apply-them-when-you-
think-best’ guidelines, with light-handed appellate review for understandably undefined 
‘reasonableness’"). 
 82. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (upholding a district court 
judge’s sentencing as reasonable under a "deferential abuse-of-discretion standard").  In 
Gall, the Court determined the standard by which appellate courts should review the 
reasonableness of sentences imposed by lower level courts.  Id. at 40.  The Court stated that, 
because the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, extraordinary circumstances are not 
required to justify a departure from the sentences recommended therein.  Id. at 47.  The 
Court held that appellate courts must review all sentences, regardless of their relation to the 
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while maintaining that sentences within the advisory guidelines may be 
overturned on appeal only for abuse of discretion."84  In effect, sentences 
within the advisory guidelines are presumptively reasonable.85  A 
sentence imposed outside of the applicable guidelines range is, however, 
not presumptively unreasonable, as had been suggested in Rita v. United 
States.86  A judge should impose a sentence "sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary."87  No definition for "necessary" was given,88 and the 
Court frowned upon any "proportional justifications," such as set 
calculations.89  Some scholars suspect that this relaxed sentencing 
structure will lead to the same problems of chaos and idiosyncratic 
disparity present before the guidelines.90  In contrast, others praise the 
shift because it allows judges most familiar with an individual case and 
defendant to "give proper sentences."91 
                                                                                                                 
Guidelines, with a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.  Id. at 41. 
 83. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (holding that "under Booker, 
the cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory only, and that the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding the crack/powder disparity effectively mandatory").  In Kimbrough, 
the Court considered whether the distinction between crack and powder cocaine in the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines was advisory or binding.  Id. at 93.  The Guidelines created a 
disparity in sentencing for the two forms of the drug; crack-related offenses resulted in a 
harsher sentence than offenses involving the powder form, regardless of the extent of the 
drug operation.  Id. at 95.  The Court determined that although the Guidelines are advisory 
after Booker, courts must treat them as a starting point for sentencing.  Id. at 108.  The Court 
reasoned that in terms of specific cases, judges have greater authority than the Sentencing 
Commission.  Id. at 109.  The Court held that in the instant case, the district court properly 
considered the sentencing range suggested in the Guidelines, addressed the relevant factors, 
and reached a reasonable sentence.  Id. at 111. 
 84. Otis, supra note 37, at 40. 
 85. See id. (discussing the practical effects of Gall and Kimbrough). 
 86. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (holding that a sentence within the 
Guidelines may be considered presumptively reasonable on appeal).  In Rita, the Court 
considered whether appellate courts may presume that a sentence within the Guidelines is 
reasonable.  Id. at 346.  The Court emphasized that such a presumption is not binding; it 
merely reflects that the Commission and the sentencing judge have come to the same 
reasonable conclusion.  Id. at 347.  The Court held that when district judges’ discretionary 
decisions and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines are aligned, the appellate court 
may presume that the sentence is reasonable.  Id. at 351. 
 87. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 89 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 88. Otis, supra note 37, at 40. 
 89. Duffy, supra note 42, at 238 (internal quotations omitted). 
 90. See, e.g., Otis, supra note 37, at 42 ("We have standardless sentencing pretending 
to have standards."). 
 91. Duffy, supra note 42, at 240. 
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Appellate courts remain unsure as to how to apply Apprendi and its 
progeny.92  Confusion exists in the courts over which standard of proof 
applies when resolving factual disputes.93  The growing trend of using 
DNA at sentencing adds complexity to this already muddled sentencing 
process.94  If a DNA match serves as an additional fact upon which the 
judge will raise the statutory maximum, it must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt by a jury under Apprendi.95  However, in many states 
the sentencing range extends over such a length of time that the DNA 
evidence may have a substantial effect on the final sentence, but not 
necessarily raise the statutory maximum.96  As a result, proving that a 
DNA sample belongs to a defendant and that the defendant committed 
the extraneous prior offense need not be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt according to Apprendi.97  The effect is that defendants may be 
significantly punished for crimes of which they were never convicted 
beyond a reasonable doubt.98  As a result, even when the additional fact 
to be used at sentencing is a DNA match to a previous unadjudicated 
crime that does not raise the statutory maximum, courts must meet a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.99  Evaluating the use of DNA at 
trial and the safeguards available at that stage of the judicial process, 
such as the use of witness or expert testimony, may shed light on how to 
avoid unbridled use of DNA at sentencing.100 
II.  The Evolution of DNA Evidence at Trial 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See Booker Report, supra note 45, at v ("[A]ppellate case law remains at an early 
stage of development."). 
 93. See id. at 22 (observing that some appellate courts have applied a preponderance 
of the evidence standard and others insist on proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 94. See id. (emphasizing that DNA evidence has further complicated an already 
divisive issue). 
 95. See Apprendi v. United States, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (enforcing the 
government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 96. See discussion supra Part I (showing that some states have broad sentencing 
ranges). 
 97. See id. ("Apprendi would never be triggered under [systems with broad sentencing 
ranges]."). 
 98. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486 (maintaining that state statutes preventing juries 
from evaluating facts that could enhance the penalty pose serious constitutional issues). 
 99. See id. at 490 (requiring that courts find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt for all elements of the offense). 
 100. See discussion supra Part I (advocating that the use of DNA evidence alone at trial 
cannot necessarily prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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A.  From Discovery of DNA to its Infallibility:  The Speedy Rise of DNA 
Admission at Trial 
DNA science progressed in the 1980s, when scientists realized that 
each DNA unit consisted of two strands of polymers.101  On each DNA 
strand base pairs of genes, or alleles, are sequenced differently, providing 
the basis for the difference in each human’s DNA.102  Only identical twins 
have the same hereditary material, unless "by pure chance, [a different 
individual] has the same DNA profile as the individual who provided the 
reference sample."103  Calculating the probability of such a random match, 
or the "random match probability" (RMP), estimates the "probability that a 
randomly selected person from the general population would match the 
crime scene sample."104  Lab technicians determine such data by calculating 
the frequency in the relevant population of each detected allele, usually of 
twenty-six, on the crime scene strand.105  A DNA match between a suspect 
and a crime would be "meaningless without some sense of how unusual it 
is."106 
Historically, the federal repositories for DNA identified only sex 
offenders, by testing semen, hair, saliva and blood often readily available at 
the scene of sexual misconduct cases.107  Today, the system identifies 
suspects for almost any crime.108  The National DNA Index System (NDIS) 
contains over 9,298,324 offender profiles and 356,343 forensic profiles as 
of January 2011.109  The FBI runs the NDIS program through the Combined 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See Malcom, supra note 13, at 313, 317 (providing a primer on DNA for 
nonscientists). 
 102. See id. (summarizing the science behind DNA evidence). 
 103. Id. at 318. 
 104. Id. at 319. 
 105. See Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA Identification 
Evidence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313, at 2c (1991) (explaining the process of DNA analysis). 
 106. Roth, supra note 21, at 1136; see also State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 582 (1993) 
("It is the probability favoring a random match . . . that provides the telling and crucial 
bottom line of DNA evidence."). 
 107. See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability 
of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 202 (2008) [hereinafter Jacobs 
& Crepet] ("Forty-four states have expanded DNA collection beyond violent and sex 
offenders to include all convicted felons."). 
 108. See id. at 203 ("A DNA identification system originally designed to identify sex 
offenders is rapidly evolving into an all-purpose identification system, similar to the 
fingerprints database."). 
 109. FBI, CODIS-NDIS STATISTICS (Jan. 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
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DNA Index System (CODIS) software that allows 180 public law 
enforcement laboratories to participate in the United States.110 
As DNA evidence expands and becomes more reliable, states broaden 
the classifications of criminals and suspects required to give DNA 
samples.111  States gradually require that DNA be entered into the system 
for a broader range of criminals, as well as suspects, and even arrestees.112  
For example, in 2009, California began taking DNA samples from anyone 
arrested for any felony, even without a charge or conviction.113  In order to 
subdue concerns over privacy rights, DNA evidence that fails to convict a 
suspect may be expunged depending upon the state requirements.114  In 
Texas, criminal records may be expunged if the person was arrested and 
acquitted, convicted and pardoned, or when no indictment or information 
was filed.115  In order to do so, the person must petition for expunction.116  
However, "[e]vidence used in criminal cases to identify a perpetrator or to 
exclude a person is required to be preserved until the person dies, is 
executed, is released on parole or completes his or her sentence."117  At the 
federal level, a convicted felon may request expungement if the conviction 
has been overturned.118  If arrested, but the charge is dismissed, acquitted or 
                                                                                                                 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 110. FBI, CODIS BROCHURE (July 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/codis_brochure. 
 111. See State Laws on DNA Data Banks Qualifying Offenses, NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/CivilandCriminal 
Justice/StateLawsonDNADataBanks/tabid/12737/Default.aspx (compiling state laws on 
DNA data banks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 112. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1140 ("[S]tate and federal DNA databases have grown 
to include not only convicted felons, but also misdemeanants and even arrestees."). 
 113. See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE INFO. BULLETIN, EXPANSION OF STATE’S DNA DATA 
BANK PROGRAM ON JANUARY 1, 2009:  COLLECTION OF DNA SAMPLES FROM ALL ADULTS 
ARRESTED FOR ANY FELONY OFFENSE (Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.ag.ca.gov/bfs/pdf/69IB_121508.pdf ("The 2008 law requires adults arrested for a 
felony Penal Code section 290 registerable sex offense, murder, or voluntary manslaughter 
(including attempts of these crimes) to provide samples for the CAL-DNA Data Bank (Penal 
Code section 296(a)(2)(A) and (B))."). 
 114. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (providing an example of a state that 
allows DNA evidence to be expunged).   
 115. See id. (allowing records to be expunged under certain circumstances). 
 116. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02 (West 2009) (outlining the procedure 
for expungement). 
 117. REPORT OF THE SOUTHERN LEGISLATIVE CONFERENCE, SOUTHERN STATES DNA 
STATUTES:  OFFENDER PROFILES AND POST-CONVICTION TESTING 46 (2002). 
 118. See FBI, CODIS-EXPUNGEMENT POLICY, EXPUNGEMENT OF DNA RECORDS IN 
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no charge was ever filed within the applicable time period, a person may 
also request expungement.119 
The standard for admissibility of DNA at trial has evolved from 
precedent outlining the admission of scientific evidence generally.  Frye v. 
United States,120 first expounded upon the need for inclusion of expert 
testimony at trial to help explain scientific evidence that may not be 
understood by the jury.121  To be sure of an expert testimony’s reliability, 
the Supreme Court appointed judges as "gatekeepers" of the testimony.122  
Judges were to review the scientific testimony before presented to the jury 
to establish that it was generally accepted by the scientific community.123  
Over seventy years later, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,124 the Supreme Court re-addressed the standard for admissibility of 
scientific evidence, in the wake of a much broader judicial power laid out in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence 403.125 
                                                                                                                 
ACCORDANCE WITH 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A), http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/codis_expungement (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (showing that a convicted felon 
may request that his federal record be expunged if the conviction has been overturned) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 119. See id. (enumerating alternative grounds on which one may request expungement). 
 120. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (finding the systolic 
blood pressure deception test had not yet gained the scientific recognition to justify 
admission of expert testimony on the subject).  In Frye, the Court considered whether 
systolic blood pressure deception test results could justify the admission of expert testimony 
on the subject.  Id.  The Court stated that a scientific principal must have gained general 
acceptance in its field to warrant the admission of expert testimony.  Id.  The Court held that 
this particular scientific principal had not yet gained sufficient scientific recognition to 
justify expert testimony.  Id. 
 121. See id. (requiring expert opinions when the trial question involved does not lie 
within the range of common experience or knowledge of an ordinary person). 
 122. See id. (suggesting that judges are responsible for determining the topics for which 
expert testimony is appropriate). 
 123. See id. (stating that, before testimony is presented to the jury, judges must 
determine whether the scientific principal of expert testimony is generally accepted in its 
field). 
 124. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1994) (holding 
that the Frye test of "general acceptance" is superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence).  In Daubert, the Court was asked to determine the appropriate standard for 
admission of scientific expert testimony in federal courts.  Id. at 582.  The Court 
acknowledged that, prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Frye provided the standard for 
determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.  Id. at 585.  However, the Court 
held that the more liberal Federal Rules of Evidence are incompatible with and have since 
superseded the Frye standard in federal courts.  Id. at 587–88. 
 125. See Lawrence Kobilinsky, Thomas F. Liotti & Jamel Oeser-Sweat, Litigating a 
DNA Case, in DNA:  FORENSICS AND LEGAL APPLICATIONS 197, 201–02 (John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 2005) (discussing the Court’s new standard for admissibility of DNA evidence in 
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The Daubert court laid out four factors to be considered by a judge 
when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence:  (1) whether the 
scientific technique has been or can be tested to determine its validity,126 (2) 
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and 
publication,127 (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error of the 
scientific technique,128 and (4) whether the scientific technique has been 
generally accepted by the scientific community.129  These factors 
incorporate a flexible judicial review of the testimony’s reliability and 
relevance superseding the prior sole "general acceptance" standard of 
Frye.130  Finally, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael Inc.131 extended the 
judge’s gate-keeping role to all expert testimony, not only scientific.132  
These standards apply to both civil and criminal cases.133 
Under these judicial guidelines on scientific evidence and "absent 
extraordinary circumstances," DNA evidence will be admitted into court.134  
DNA evidence first entered into a criminal case as evidence in State v. 
Woodall.135  Almost every state now deems DNA evidence admissible due 
                                                                                                                 
light of the Federal Rules of Evidence 403); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing exclusion 
of evidence that could potentially confuse the jury when the danger of jury confusion 
outweighs the value of the evidence). 
 126. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (requiring that the testimony be scientifically valid). 
 127. See id. (listing peer review and publication as relevant factors in determining the 
validity of scientific evidence). 
 128. See id. at 594 (stating that the Court should consider the technique’s known or 
potential rate of error). 
 129. See id. (applying the Frye "general acceptance" standard as one factor among a 
more flexible group of factors). 
 130. See id. at 594 (emphasizing the flexible nature of inquiry under Rule 702); see also 
id. at 589 (arguing that the Frye standard of "general acceptance" should not be applied in 
federal trials). 
 131. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, Inc., 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that the 
Daubert "gatekeeping" obligation extends to all expert testimony).  In Kumho Tire Co., the 
Court considered how Daubert’s holding should apply to non-scientific expert testimony.  
Id. at 141.  The Court stated that Daubert’s rationale is not limited only to scientific experts.  
Id. at 148.  It would be difficult for judges to draw distinctions between strictly scientific 
testimony and otherwise specialized knowledge.  Id.  The Court concluded that such 
distinctions are not necessary.  Id.  Thus, the Court determined that Daubert’s holding 
applies to non-scientific expert testimony as well.  Id. at 147. 
 132. See id. at 147 (extending the Daubert ruling to cover all evidence mentioned in 
Rule 702:  "scientific," "technical," or "other specialized knowledge"). 
 133. Kobilinsky, Liotti & Oeser-Sweat, supra note 125, at 205 (noting that the 
gatekeeping function applies to both civil and criminal cases). 
 134. See Malcom, supra note 13, at 314 (noting that admissibility concerns are no 
longer raised). 
 135. State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 260 (W. Va. 1989) (finding DNA typing 
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to advances in technology over the past twenty years.136  Nonetheless, a trial 
court must still determine that the evidence and proffered testimony will be 
sufficiently reliable, relevant and probative to help the jury come to a 
verdict.137  When these standards are met, a typical cold hit trial includes 
presentation of the DNA evidence, a witness to establish the chain of 
custody, and a witness to explain the testing process and results.138  The 
analyst may also present RMP information showing the probability in the 
population that the evidence would match the suspect’s DNA profile.139  
The analyst decides "with reasonable scientific certainty [whether] a 
particular individual is the source of an evidentiary sample."140  In order to 
make such a determination, the DNA must have a RMP of around 1 in 280 
billion.141 
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma simplified the 
evidentiary process at trial by determining that "DNA match evidence 
obtained through RFLP [restriction fragment length polymorphism] 
analysis, and DNA statistics calculated through standard population 
                                                                                                                 
analysis reliable and generally accepted, and thus no longer requiring a Frye hearing).  In 
Woodall, the Court considered whether DNA evidence would be admissible at trial based on 
the Frye standard or the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.  Id. at 259.  The Court stated that 
the burden of proof remains on the proponent because unreliable scientific evidence can be 
more dangerous than a complete lack of scientific evidence in a criminal proceeding.  Id. at 
260.  The Court determined that the scientific community generally accepts the reliability of 
DNA testing, and the evidence, though inconclusive, is admissible.  Id. at 260–61. 
 136. See Kobilinsky, Liotti & Oeser-Sweat, supra note 125, at 236; Paul C. Giannelli, 
The DNA Story:  An Alternative View, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 380, 380–81 (1997) 
(reviewing HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLOOD CRIED OUT:  A PROSECUTOR’S SPELLBINDING 
ACCOUNT OF DNA’S POWER TO FREE OR CONVICT (1996)). 
 137. See, e.g., Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 165–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) 
(requiring the trial court meet a "‘threshold determination’ as to whether the testimony will 
help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue . . . .  [and then] 
determine whether the proffered testimony’s probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice" (internal citations omitted)). 
 138. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1135 (explaining the elements of a typical "pure cold 
hit" trial). 
 139. See id. at 1138 ("The analyst decides, based on the practice of her laboratory, 
when the RMP is small enough to justify an assertion of source attribution [as opposed to a 
full RMP report]."). 
 140. See id. at 10 (citing Bruce Budowle et al., Source Attribution of a Forensic DNA 
Profile, 2 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (July 2000), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july 
2000/source.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (internal quotations omitted) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 141. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1138–39 ("The FBI currently sets its source attribution 
threshold at around 1 in 280 billion, or about [1,000] times the population of the United 
States."). 
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genetics formulas, pass the Daubert test [and] from this point forward, trial 
courts faced with DNA profiling evidence through these means need not 
conduct a Daubert pretrial admissibility hearing."142  However, the court 
noted that cross-examination would still serve as a way to attack the 
reliability of DNA profiling evidence.143 
The evolution of DNA admission at trial hastily approaches a point 
where DNA can be used on its own without any corroborating evidence.144  
This steep incline in dependence on DNA demands a careful examination 
by the legal community as that becomes reality.145 
B.  DNA’s Power Extends to Convictions Without Any Other Corroborating 
Evidence 
As a result of advances in technology, increased reliance on DNA 
testing procedures,146 the growing size of DNA databases,147 and the 
expansion of John Doe indictments,148 DNA evidence is being used to 
convict more frequently without corroborating evidence.149  In the past few 
years, court decisions have sparked debate over whether DNA, alone, 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 338 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (determining that 
the Daubert test applies to scientific evidence and that certain procedures for testing DNA 
are reliable). 
 143. See id. at 339 (noting that the weight and credibility of DNA profile evidence 
remains "subject to attack through cross-examination and testimonial challenges"). 
 144. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1132 (noting an "emerging phenomenon of ‘pure cold 
hit’ DNA prosecutions in which the entirety of the government’s case against the suspect, 
aside from his prior conviction, is a DNA profile match or a match accompanied only by 
general evidence"). 
 145. See, e.g., Technology and Liberty:  Forensic DNA Databases, AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION (May 20, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/forensic-dna-
databanks (noting that the trend to store DNA "represents a grave threat to privacy and the 
4th Amendment [and] also turns the legal notion that a person is ‘innocent until proven 
guilty’ on its head") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 146. See Frank B. Ulmer, Using DNA Profiles to Obtain "John Doe" Arrest Warrants 
and Indictments, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1585, 1598 (2001) (noting that DNA evidence is 
admissible in all U.S. jurisdictions). 
 147. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 145 (noting that "[s]tate 
and [f]ederal DNA databanks are expanding at an alarming rate"). 
 148. See Ulmer, supra note 146, at 1586–88 (stating that courts of all jurisdictions have 
allowed the indictment of an unknown suspect’s DNA in order to toll the statute of 
limitations). 
 149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (noting the "pure cold hit" DNA 
prosecution phenomenon). 
THE AFFECTS OF APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY 287 
provides sufficient evidence to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.150 
The most controversial cases present situations in which the defendant 
is convicted on DNA evidence alone, with no corroborating evidence.151  
These instances are rare because often there will be some other piece of 
corroborating evidence.152  People v. Rush,153 serves as one of the extreme 
cases of conviction based on DNA evidence alone.154  In Rush, the only 
evidence that existed linking the defendant to the crime was the DNA 
evidence.155  An FBI agent testified that the probability of selecting another 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Malcom, supra note 13, at 315 n.17 (listing court decisions that have held that 
DNA evidence alone is sufficient for conviction). 
 151. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1133 (noting "‘the question whether or not DNA 
evidence on its own is enough to convict an accused’ was recently described as ‘one of the 
most talked-about points regarding DNA evidence’" (citing ANDREI SEMIKHODSKII, DEALING 
WITH DNA EVIDENCE:  A LEGAL GUIDE 136 (2007))). 
 152. See, e.g., Malcom, supra note 13, at 331 (distinguishing Springfield v. State, 860 
P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1993) and People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)), aff’d, 
981 P.2d 958 (Cal. 1999), which included additional evidence to corroborate the DNA 
evidence); see also Roth, supra note 21, at 1132 (acknowledging a trend towards "pure cold 
hit" cases with or without generalized pieces of evidence); see also State v. Toomes, 191 
S.W.3d 122, 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (listing cases in which the Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Tennessee weighed the sufficiency of DNA evidence supported by corroborating 
evidence). 
 153. See People v. Rush, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (determining 
that the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty when the chance that the DNA 
evidence belonged to another person’s profile was 500 million to 1).  In Rush, a jury had 
convicted the defendant of rape in the first degree and robbery in the first degree, basing its 
decision largely on DNA evidence.  Id. at 363.  The court considered whether DNA evidence 
is "circumstantial in nature and not absolute [and therefore] such evidence cannot alone 
serve to prove . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances presented."  Id. 
(internal citations omitted).  The court noted that "a jury verdict must be sustained if, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" and that 
guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence.  Id. (emphasis in original).  
Rejecting the defendant’s argument that DNA evidence "cannot serve as sole evidence 
supporting his conviction," the court reasoned that DNA evidence has been "found reliable 
by the scientific community," is admissible evidence, and "can provide strong evidence of a 
defendant’s presence at and participation in a crime."  Id. at 364 (internal citations omitted).  
Noting that the DNA evidence was corroborated as the defendant’s by scientific testimony, 
the court determined that the "the jury could properly credit as establishing the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. 
 154. See id. (finding that the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty with DNA 
evidence alone). 
 155. See id. at 363 ("The principal evidence implicating the defendant in the 
commission of the crimes was a DNA profile, which revealed that his DNA matched the 
DNA in a semen sample recovered from the victim."). 
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individual at random from the population that would have the same set of 
DNA profiles was less than 1 in 500 million.156  The only other evidence 
was the testimony of an acquaintance of the defendant who saw him in the 
area of the crime three days prior.157  Even more striking was the fact that 
the victim identified a courtroom spectator as the perpetrator of the offense, 
not the suspect.158  Nonetheless, the trial court placed "unfettered faith in 
the reliability of DNA evidence."159   
The Texas Court of Appeals upheld a similar conviction in Roberson 
v. State,160 relying on Rush: 
The court is, therefore, satisfied that the testimony of even one DNA 
expert that there is a genetic match between the semen recovered from 
the victim of a rape and the blood of the defendant, a total stranger, and 
the statistical probability that anyone else was the source of that semen 
are 1 in 500 million is legally sufficient to support a guilty verdict.161 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See id. at 364 (proposing that the possibility of the DNA matching another person 
was "virtually nonexistent"). 
 157. See Malcom, supra note 13, at 333 ("Notably, the only other identification 
evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of an acquaintance of Rush who, 
three days prior to the crime, saw him in the ‘vicinity’ where the crime took place." (citing 
People v. Rush, 630 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), aff’d, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1998))). 
 158. See id. ("At trial, the victim identified another individual in the courtroom as the 
perpetrator, leading the court to exclude the previous photo and lineup identifications of 
Rush." (citing People v. Rush, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 631–32)). 
 159. Id. at 334. 
 160. See Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ("Giving due 
deference to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the verdict [based only on a DNA match] is 
not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.").  
In Roberson, the court considered whether DNA evidence could result in the conviction of a 
defendant without other circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 159.  A jury convicted the appellant 
in Roberson of an aggravated sexual assault charge based on DNA evidence alone, even 
though the assaulted woman "was unable to identify her assailant at the time of the offense 
or at the trial."  Id. at 159–60.  The court noted that circumstantial evidence is admissible and 
reasoned that, when viewing the evidence favorably to the jury’s finding, the standard for the 
legal sufficiency of evidence is whether "any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the offense charged."  Id. at 164 (internal 
citations omitted).  Given that DNA evidence is admissible and that there was a 1 in 5.5 
billion chance that the DNA belonged to a person other than the appellant, the court 
determined that a jury could have reasonably found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt and the jury’s "verdict [was] not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence 
as to be clearly wrong and unjust."  Id. at 163–72. 
 161. Id. at 170. 
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Most recently, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. 
Toomes,162 upheld a defendant’s conviction based on DNA evidence with a 
1 in 5,128,000,000 probability that his DNA profile would be found within 
the African-American population; 1 in 22,870,000,000 probability within 
the Caucasian population; 1 in 90,910,000,000 within the Southeastern 
Hispanic population; and 1 in 185,700,000,000 within the Southwestern 
Hispanic population.163  The victim could not identify Toomes as the person 
who assaulted her.164 
Scholars have raised concerns about the legitimacy of these cases and 
whether they violate a defendant’s rights.165  One scholar argues that "[t]he 
possibility of human error and manipulated results demands that DNA 
evidence, by itself, should not be sufficient for conviction."166  The author 
asserts that reliability of the DNA evidence requires corroborating 
evidence, even despite any constitutional or evidentiary argument.167  
Today, DNA evidence faces problems with "poor laboratory proficiency 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See State v. Toomes, 191 S.W.3d 122, 131 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that 
DNA evidence, without corroborating evidence, was sufficient to support conviction).  In 
Toomes, the court considered whether DNA evidence was sufficient to sustain an aggravated 
rape conviction.  Id. at 127.  A jury convicted appellant of aggravated rape and aggravated 
criminal trespass, even though the victim did not know her attacker nor could identify him as 
appellant at trial.  Id. at 124.  The only evidence connecting appellant with the crime was the 
DNA evidence taken from the victim using a rape kit.  Id. at 125–27.  The standard of 
review for the sufficiency of evidence is whether the trier of fact could have reasonably 
convicted the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and circumstantial evidence—such as 
DNA evidence—may exclusively establish a criminal offense.  Id. at 128 (internal citations 
omitted).  The court analogized DNA evidence to fingerprint identification for purposes of 
determining identity, concluding that DNA evidence is "unquestionably reliable" (although 
not "absolutely infallible") but "accessibility of a defendant to the examined object is highly 
relevant because it could suggest an innocent reason for a defendant’s fingerprints to be on 
an object."  Id. at 130–31.  The court concluded that there was no innocent reason for semen 
to be on the victim’s body and expert testimony confirmed the statistical improbability of the 
DNA belonging to a different individual than the appellant.  Id. at 131.  As a result, the court 
found the DNA evidence sufficient to convict the appellant, despite the lack of corroborating 
evidence.  Id. 
 163. See id. at 127 (noting the statistical probability that the DNA belonged to another 
individual rather than the defendant). 
 164. See id. at 124 ("[The victim] did not know the identity of her attacker, and she 
could not identify at trial the defendant as the person who assaulted and raped her."). 
 165. See generally Malcom, supra note 17, at 338 (noting that "there appears to be a 
disturbing trend among U.S. state courts to allow convictions based only on DNA 
evidence"). 
 166. Id. at 321. 
 167. See id. (asserting that making a change to require corroborating evidence in 
addition to DNA evidence "must be made to ensure the credibility of [DNA] evidence that 
has become such a powerful tool for criminal prosecutions"). 
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testing, contamination, lack of proper laboratory protocols or accreditation, 
improper techniques, lack of quality control, and broken chains of custody," 
168 as well as problems with temperature control.169  Additionally, the 
increasing demand for DNA analysis creates further errors in laboratories 
due to overworked technicians.170  Finally, legal scholars fear that jurors 
may be unreasonably impressed by the DNA evidence and statistics.171 
The sufficiency of DNA evidence has been compared to that of 
fingerprint evidence.172  Courts vary in their use of fingerprint evidence, 
alone, to convict.173  Courts in Tennessee and New York have upheld 
convictions based solely on fingerprinting evidence.174  More recently, 
however, fingerprint evidence has lost traction as the "gold standard" of 
evidence,175 and scholars caution that courts must not too quickly accept the 
reliability of DNA for fear of the same demise.176 
Andrea Roth, a professor at Stanford and scholar on DNA evidence, 
addresses the appropriate standard of review for convictions based solely on 
DNA, or "pure cold hits," and suggests a probabilistic standard be used in 
order to traverse the line between probability and certainty of defendant’s 
guilt.177  Roth argues "that there exists a point at which the numbers are so 
                                                                                                                 
 168. See Shelton, supra note 19, at 324 (citing Joel D. Liberman et al., Gold Versus 
Platinum:  Do Jurors Recognize the Superiority and Limitations of DNA Evidence 
Compared to Other Types of Forensic Evidence?, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 27, 31 
(2008)). 
 169. See id. at 324 (noting the challenge of laboratory temperature variances because 
"DNA is very sensitive to environmental conditions"). 
 170. See id. at 324–25 ("The overwhelming demand [for DNA testing] may be resulting 
in poor laboratory practices by inexperienced or overworked technicians to the degree that 
confidence in DNA testing results is being affected."). 
 171. See Malcom, supra note 13, at 324 (citing Kimberlianne Podlas, "The CSI 
Effect:"  Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 429, 
433 (2006) (referring to the "CSI effect" created by television portraying forensic science as 
"insurmountable")). 
 172. See id. at 328 (describing fingerprint evidence as a "powerful lesson applicable to 
DNA evidence"). 
 173. See, e.g., id. at 325–28 (discussing the use of fingerprint evidence to convict in 
various jurisdictions). 
 174. See id. at 327 (noting that "[s]ince 1962, courts in Tennessee and New York have 
upheld convictions based solely on fingerprint evidence" (citing Jamison v. State, 354 
S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tenn. 1962)). 
 175. See id. at 328 (noting that "[f]ingerprint evidence, once considered to be the ‘gold 
standard’ in identification now appears to be more akin to pyrite, ‘fool’s gold’"). 
 176. See id. (suggesting that courts review the use of DNA evidence cautiously). 
 177. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1178–84 (proposing a framework for determining 
sufficiency of DNA evidence without corroborating evidence). 
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compelling as to amount to an assertion of certainty rather than probability.  
When that point is reached, pure cold hit evidence is capable of inspiring an 
actual belief in the defendant’s guilt sufficient to justify conviction."178  Her 
argument stems from the need to show the jury that the DNA is so rare in 
the population that no possibility exists that the DNA is not the 
defendant’s.179  DNA analysts give such data by calculating the RMP.180  
The strength of the probability depends on the uniqueness of the DNA, as 
well as the quality of the sample.181 
Roth suggests that a decision based purely on numerical statistics must 
inspire certainty in the jury that reaches "beyond a reasonable doubt."182  
The reasonable-doubt standard stems from a requirement of "moral 
certainty."183  The introduction of moral certainty into the verdict equation 
requires that the jury actually believe in the guilt of the defendant, as 
opposed to blindly following statistics and mathematics.184  Roth outlines 
recent studies suggesting that jurors will refuse to convict on statistical 
evidence if they do not believe in the defendant’s actual guilt, despite "a 
high probability of the defendant’s culpability."185  However, when the 
probability of a defendant’s guilt reaches a certain level, the jurors become 
more confident.186  Roth suggests that courts choose a threshold that instills 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. at 5. 
 179. See id. at 7 ("[T]he match is essentially meaningless without some sense of how 
unusual it is . . . ."). 
 180. See id. ("Based on the assumption that the allelic frequencies among the loci are 
statistically independent, the laboratory multiplies the [26] frequencies together to report for 
each group a ‘random match probability’ (RMP), or probability that a random person 
selected from the population will exhibit the [26]-allele profile."). 
 181. See id. ("The size of the RMP depends on how unusual the alleles in the particular 
profile are, as well as the quality of the evidence sample."). 
 182. See id. at 18 (noting that the jury must reach their conclusion beyond a reasonable 
doubt). 
 183. See id. at 32 ("The ‘moral certainty’ standard evolved into a requirement that the 
events alleged by the government be ‘so certain as not to admit of any reasonable doubt 
concerning them.’" (citing Barbara J. Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty":  Theories of 
Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600–1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 158 (1986))). 
 184. See id. at 31 ("[T]he certainty required to justify conviction in a criminal case— 
‘moral certainty’ —falls short of the metaphysical certainty of absolute ‘mathematical’ or 
‘demonstrative’ proof of guilt but still requires that jurors reach an ‘actual belief’ in the 
defendant’s guilt."). 
 185. See id. at 38–39 (explaining the phenomenon of the "Wells Effect," which shows 
that jurors hesitate to convict when they can easily simulate a scenario in which the 
defendant is not guilty). 
 186. See id. at 39–40 ("If jurors experience such unfathomable numbers as ‘effectively 
implying certainty’ rather than mere probability, then a sufficiently high source probability 
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such confidence in the jurors that the defendant’s guilt is found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.187  Any cold hit cases that do not meet this threshold, as 
found by a judge, need not go to a jury, because defendants have a right not 
to be tried on insufficient evidence.188  In such a situation, there would have 
to be no other corroborating evidence for the jury to weigh.189 
III.  The Need for Safeguards on DNA Use in Sentencing 
As this note has suggested, DNA evidence alone can rarely be 
sufficient evidentiary evidence at trial to convict a defendant.190  Part of a 
DNA case involves the defendant’s ability to suggest that the science is not 
infallible, that labs make mistakes, or that the evidence was collected 
incorrectly.191  Defendants must be able to challenge the process of the 
DNA collection and testing, the chain of custody of the evidence, possible 
contamination of the evidence, the consequences of a mixture of DNA 
evidence and the prosecution’s expert witness testimony.192  The 
                                                                                                                 
may have the potential—like other fallible but absolute assertions about a defendant’s 
guilt—to inspire an actual belief in, and thus moral certainty of, guilt." (citing MICHAEL 
LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE:  THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING 184, 
at 345 (2008))). 
 187. See id. at 17–30 (discussing the shortcomings of courts choosing statistical 
thresholds of DNA source probabilities because juries tend to rely on them when 
determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 188. See id. at 44 ("Assuming the legal community comes to agree that certain source 
probabilities in cold hit cases are too low to form the basis for a rational juror’s actual belief 
of guilt, judges should be bound to grant motions for acquittal in cases that do not meet a 
minimum threshold."). 
 189. See id. at 43 (noting that "[u]nlike conflicting eyewitness testimony, a 
[government case consisting of] ‘coldly statistical’ [evidence alone] gives jurors ‘no 
opportunity to exercise’ their skills of ‘perception or intuition,’ the very qualities that justify 
trial by jury to begin with" (citing Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive 
Inferences:  The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1196 (1979) and Eleanor 
Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 495, 504 (1987))). 
 190. See Kobilinsky, Liotti & Oeser-Sweat, supra note 125, at 227 ("If DNA itself were 
enough to solve the crime, we would not need trials."). 
 191. See Shelton, supra note 19, at 323 (admitting that DNA profiling is not infallible 
and is subject to human error (citing Johnathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the 
Presentation of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 23 (1993) and William C. 
Thompson, Guide to Forensic DNA Evidence, in EXPERT EVIDENCE:  A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE TO LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE FJC MANUAL 195, 231–36 (Bert Black & Patrick W. Lee 
eds., 1997))). 
 192. See Kobilinsky, Liotti & Oeser-Sweat, supra note 125, at 236–37 (presenting 
defense arguments against admitted DNA evidence). 
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admissibility of scientific evidence remains with the judge, and although 
DNA evidence has largely been accepted in criminal cases, each case 
demands a careful review before using that information to convict.193  
Similarly, courts should not immediately dismiss these issues when DNA 
matches are introduced at sentencing either.194 
Standards of proof and admissibility at sentencing less frequently 
receive attention because courts minimize the fact that constitutional rights 
of defendants continue to apply after conviction.195  Evidence admissible at 
sentencing has always been broader than evidence admissible at trial, due to 
the fact that defendants at the punishment phase have already been found 
guilty.196  Texas, for example, has bifurcated trials with a guilt phase and an 
innocence phase, as well as a separate punishment phase.197  The evidence 
admissible at the punishment stage is broad and:  
may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court 
deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior 
criminal record of the defendant . . . and . . . any other evidence of an 
extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by 
evidence to have been committed by the defendant or for which he could 
be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether he has previously 
been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act.198 
Although broad, this evidentiary standard still requires the court to 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
extraneous offense.199 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See, e.g., id. at 238 (noting that "[j]udges have extraordinary responsibility in 
deciding on the admissibility of scientific evidence and in accepting the credentials of expert 
witnesses . . . .  The judge must maintain an open mind . . . [because i]t is untrue that DNA 
analysis is the same in every case"); see also Malcom, supra note 17, at 338 ("The legal 
community should want and demand more evidence than mere testimony of a genetic match, 
riddled with the possibility of human error, before tarnishing a defendant with a 
conviction."). 
 194. See id. (discussing that judges should use caution when considering DNA 
evidence). 
 195. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 33, at 48 ("With few exceptions, the judiciary 
has rejected constitutional challenges to non-capital sentencing factors."). 
 196. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (2010) (permitting a 
sentencing judge to consider any relevant and reliable information, even if that information 
would be inadmissible at trial). 
 197. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon 2009) (stating verdict 
procedure in Texas for criminal trials). 
 198. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(3)(a)(1) (Vernon 2009). 
 199. See id. (noting that the state may introduce "any other evidence of an extraneous 
crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been 
committed by the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible"). 
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Few state courts have analyzed the use of DNA database matches at 
sentencing.200  In Roberson v. State, the prosecution called one woman at 
sentencing to testify about the defendant’s prior conviction of aggravated 
sexual assault.201  The government then presented three witnesses, each 
testifying to the defendant’s commission of an extraneous unadjudicated 
aggravated sexual assault.202  None of the women could identify the 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes,203 but a DNA analyst was called 
to testify that, the "appellant could not be excluded as the donor of the 
sperm in each case."204  "[T]here was a 1 in 5.5 billion chance in each 
offense that appellant’s DNA profile would match another individual."205  
In addition, the appellate court noted in its decision that the four extraneous 
offenses "revealed a distinctive modus operandi that was so unusual as to 
mark each offense as one person’s handiwork or signature."206  The defense 
rested without offering any evidence207 and the trial court sentenced 
defendant to life imprisonment.208  The Court found that the DNA evidence 
was sufficient to convict;209 however, specific analysis of the unadjudicated 
offenses at sentencing was not raised as an issue.210  Despite the lack of 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that whether DNA evidence is sufficient 
for conviction has "generated little litigation or scholarship"). 
 201. See Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ("[The prior 
victim] related that she was unable to identify appellant based solely on the events that 
occurred in the early morning hours on the day of the offense."). 
 202. See id. (noting that three women "testified to an extraneous unadjudicated 
aggravated sexual assault that occurred in their homes"). 
 203. See id. ("None of the three women could identify appellant as the perpetrator of 
the offense in her individual case."). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 163 n.11 (citing Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1996); Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Barrett v. 
State, 900 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. App. 1995)); see also TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) (noting that 
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as . . . identity"). 
 207. See Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) at 172 (noting 
that the defendant offered no evidence contrary to the DNA evidence). 
 208. See id. at 164 (noting that the trial court sentenced the defendant to life 
imprisonment after he presented no evidence to rebut the DNA evidence). 
 209. See id. at 172 (upholding the trial court’s judgment after concluding that the jury 
verdict based on DNA evidence was "not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of 
evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust"). 
 210. See id. at 165 (addressing only the admissibility of DNA evidence generally). 
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case law, sentencing issues will continue to surface as courts apply 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.211 
The evolution of sentencing jurisprudence since Apprendi suggests 
federal sentencing has judicial limitations based on defendant’s 
constitutional rights.212  In turn, DNA evidence used at sentencing needs 
review and procedural limitations.213  Despite the slide back towards more 
judicial discretion, Apprendi, Booker, Rita, and Gall have maintained that 
defendants must continue to be protected by the Fifth Amendment due 
process clause and the Sixth Amendment "right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury"214 even during sentencing.215  A defendant must still 
be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury for every element of a 
crime for which he is charged.216  "Since Winship, we have made clear 
beyond peradventure that Winship’s due process and associated jury 
protections extend, to some degree, ‘to determinations that [go] not to a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence.’"217  
A defendant’s culpability must be found by jury trial, not sentencing.218 
One reason for finding the New Jersey statute in Apprendi invalid 
stemmed from the decision that the "biased purpose inquiry" was part of the 
"commission of the offense" 219 and would enhance the sentence above the 
                                                                                                                 
 211. See Roth, supra note 22, at 7 (noting the scarcity of case law concerning 
sentencing issues and DNA matching).  
 212. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (limiting the judge’s 
sentencing authority to the framework set by the jury’s verdict). 
 213. See generally Roth, supra note 21 (discussing the limitations of relying solely on 
DNA evidence to convict). 
 214. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 215. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476–77 (2000) ("Taken together, 
these rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to ‘a jury determination that [he] is 
guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’" 
(citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 278 (1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970))); see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 
309 (maintaining the "jury’s traditional function of finding the facts essential to lawful 
imposition of the penalty"). 
 216. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (noting the right to have a jury determine guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970))). 
 217. Id. at 484 (citing Almenderez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 251 (1998) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 218. See id. at 485 (noting that a jury determines whether a defendant is guilty of "all 
the elements of an offense" but it may be left to the judge to decide whether to impose the 
maximum penalty (citing Almenderez-Torres, 523 U.S. at  257 n.2)). 
 219. See id. at 496 (noting that "New Jersey’s biased purpose inquiry goes precisely to 
what happened in the ‘commission of the offense’"). 
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statutory maximum.220  As a result, the fact had to be proven by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.221  The Court further suggested that "both the 
purpose of the offender, and even the known identity of the victim, will 
sometimes be hotly disputed, and that the outcome may well depend in 
some cases on the standard of proof and the identity of the factfinder."222  
Evidently, the Court recognizes the difference between accepting the 
validity of a prior conviction that has already been placed in front of a jury 
and a required fact of that offense that has not.223  This analysis suggests 
that the identity of a defendant, a factor required to prove any offense,224 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before used to implement a 
sentence above the statutory maximum for an extraneous unadjudicated 
offense.225  If a DNA database match stood as the sole evidence proving the 
defendant’s identity in an extraneous crime, it would have to be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt as well.226 
The recent decisions applying Apprendi safeguard defendant’s rights at 
sentencing.227  Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion of the Court in Blakely, 
explains that Apprendi makes the sentencing process much fairer to 
criminal defendants because a defendant can no longer: 
[S]ee his maximum potential sentence balloon from as little as five years 
to as much as life imprisonment . . . based not on facts proved to his 
peers beyond a reasonable doubt, but on facts extracted after trial from a 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See id. at 491 (noting that although the jury convicted a defendant of a second-
degree offense, the judge could impose a sentence identical to one for a first-degree offense 
after he conducted a second proceeding following the jury verdict). 
 221. See id. at 490 (stating that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
 222. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475 (2000). 
 223. See id. at 496 ("[T]he fact that New Jersey, along with numerous other States, has 
also made precisely the same conduct the subject of an independent substantive offense 
makes it clear that the mere presence of this ‘enhancement’ in a sentencing statute does not 
define its character."). 
 224. See, e.g., Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting 
that "the State is required to prove [the identity of the accused] beyond a reasonable doubt" 
(citing Johnson v. State, 673 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Rice v. State, 801 
S.W.2d 16, 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990))). 
 225. See supra notes 212–23 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of a 
jury finding a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 226. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(3)(a)(1) (Vernon 2009) (stating that 
the jury must find a defendant guilty of every element of the crime). 
 227. See supra notes 210–212 and accompanying text (discussing Apprendi’s effect on 
subsequent cases). 
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report compelled by a probation officer who the judge thinks more 
likely got it right than got it wrong.228 
Justice Scalia had previously, in his Apprendi concurrence, analyzed 
the history of sentencing in order to show that Apprendi returns to "the 
status quo that reflected the original meaning of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments."229  In his view, the status quo of "a ‘crime’ includes every 
fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment."230 
Scalia’s review of factors constituting elements of a crime included 
prior convictions.231  He pointed out that at common law prior convictions 
had to be included in an indictment if a higher sentence was requested on 
account of recidivism.232  "If a fact is by law the basis for imposing or 
increasing punishment—for establishing or increasing the prosecution’s 
entitlement—it is an element. . . .  When one considers the question from 
this perspective, it is evident why the fact of a prior conviction is an 
element under a recidivism statute."233  In one historic 1863 case, State v. 
Haynes,234 a Vermont court held that a defendant’s contested identity in a 
prior offense should be permitted to be resolved by a jury.235  If such 
                                                                                                                 
 228. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 311–12 (2004). 
 229. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 518 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. at 515–16 (stating that "a crime includes any fact to which punishment 
attaches"). 
 232. See id. at 516 (citing Wood v. People, 53 N.Y. 511, 513 (1873) (holding that "the 
facts of the prior conviction and of the discharge must be proved to the jury")). 
 233. Id. at 521. 
 234. State v. Haynes, 35 Vt. 570, 572–73 (1863) (acknowledging that State v. Freeman, 
27 Vt. 523, 528 (1855) had anticipated the holding in Haynes by suggesting the use of a jury 
to resolve disputes over identity).  In Haynes, the court considered whether evidence of a 
prior conviction should have been presented to a jury rather than at the sentencing stage.  Id. 
at 571.  Under statutory law, the county court convicted respondent for "furnishing 
intoxicating liquors;" however, he took exceptions at trial and appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Vermont.  Id. at 570–71.  After the court overruled the exceptions, the prosecuting 
attorney entered evidence of previous offenses "of the same character" and moved that the 
court should convict the respondent.  Id. at 571.  The liquor statute allowed increased 
sentencing for second and third offenses, but the court noted that State v. Freeman suggested 
that "any issue of fact" might be decided by the jury.  Id.  The court stated that according to 
Freeman, the jury not only decides issues of fact such as "the identity of the respondent with 
the person named in the record of the former conviction" but also "ascertain[s] what 
sentence should be imposed."  Id. at 572.  As a result, the court stated that the county court 
should have considered the previous convictions.  Id. at 573. 
 235. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 509 (2000) ("[I]f a defendant charged 
with a successive violation of the liquor laws contested identity—that is, whether the person 
in the record of the prior conviction was the same as the defendant—he should be permitted 
to have a jury resolve the question." (citing State v. Haynes, 35 Vt. 570, 572–73 (1863))). 
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limitations were applied today, the prosecution would be required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt at sentencing that the DNA of the unadjudicated 
crime introduced came from defendant.236  Courts could go further and 
require that the unadjudicated crime be proven, with the help of the DNA 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt before the DNA evidence can be 
introduced at a later sentencing.237  However, proving sentencing factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt at sentencing surpasses any evidentiary standard 
pronounced in Apprendi.238 
Apprendi requires only that facts used to punish the defendant outside 
the statutory maximum be proven by a jury.239  As a result, it has been 
suggested that Apprendi requires judges to determine which evidence may 
raise a punishment outside the statutory maximum before sentencing 
begins.240  With regards to DNA, a judge would have to first, determine if 
the DNA evidence to be introduced at sentencing could raise the sentence 
above the statutory maximum imposed, and second, if necessary, hold a 
separate hearing for purposes of admitting the DNA.241  A mini jury hearing 
prior to or during the sentencing proceedings would have to be incorporated 
into the process in order to establish that the DNA "cold hit" matches 
defendant.242  Extrapolating from Andrea Roth’s recommended standard of 
proof for DNA, the mini hearing could be obviated by requiring the DNA 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text (discussing that the identity of the 
accused, such as evidence of a DNA match, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 237. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(3)(a)(1) (Vernon 2009) (stating that 
Texas’ evidentiary standard requires the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the extraneous offense); but see discussion supra Part II (asserting that 
Apprendi requires that courts only meet a preponderance of the evidence standard, even if 
the additional fact used at sentencing is a DNA match to a previous unadjudicated crime that 
does not raise the statutory maximum). 
 238. See id. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis added)). 
 239. See id. at 497 (noting that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury"). 
 240. See e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (stating that a "judge 
exceeds his proper authority" if he inflicts a punishment beyond the statutory maximum 
without additional findings of fact by the jury, implying that all fact-finding questions be 
resolved before sentencing and requiring judicial foresight (internal citations omitted)).  
 241. See supra notes 231–243 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances 
under which DNA evidence should require a mini jury hearing). 
 242. See id. (discussing that defendants need procedural safeguards against judicial 
abuse, such as trial by jury, because not all "cold hit" DNA matches are the result of a prior 
conviction). 
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meet a probabilistic standard.243  If the offered DNA met the probabilistic 
standard, it would prove the defendant’s identity beyond a reasonable doubt 
and bypass the need for more proof.244  If, on the other hand, the DNA 
evidence did not meet the probabilistic standard, other evidence would be 
required in order to prove the prior crime and subsequent enhanced 
sentencing.245 
It is true that in some circumstances the state may have to bear the 
additional expense of a separate jury trial during the penalty phase;  
however, the Supreme Court has recognized this possibility.246  The Court 
explains that, "the interest in fairness and reliability protected by the right to 
a jury trial . . . has always outweighed the interest in concluding trials 
swiftly."247  Additionally, procedures such as disclosure of "cold hit" DNA 
matches prior to trial would lessen the burden on both parties by allowing 
them to foresee and prepare for a presentencing hearing.248  DNA evidence 
of prior offenses should not come up at the last minute because it will 
ultimately affect sentencing.249 
If DNA evidence of a possible prior crime will not increase the 
punishment above the statutory maximum for the convicted offense, there 
exists no need to hold the mini-sentencing hearing on the DNA.250  In that 
                                                                                                                 
 243. See supra notes 157–161 and accompanying text (discussing Roth’s suggestion 
that a probabilistic standard can become the equivalent of the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard). 
 244. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1184 (proposing that DNA match statistics can provide 
sufficient evidence of guilt when over a probabilistic threshold because the match then 
inspires actual belief in the guilt). 
 245. See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text (suggesting that a defendant has 
the right not to be tried on insufficient evidence, such as DNA evidence that does not meet 
the probabilistic standard, and that a jury weighs other corroborating evidence). 
 246. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 319 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(suspecting that Apprendi could result in "additional costs . . . .  [If] a legislature 
desires . . . consideration of [prior bad acts or criminal history] at sentencing . . . [without] 
impact[ing] a jury’s initial determination of guilt, [because] the State may have to bear the 
additional expense of a separate, full-blown jury trial during the penalty phase"). 
 247. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243 (2005) (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 
313). 
 248. See generally Kobilinsky, Liotti & Oeser-Sweat, supra note 125, at 218 
(discussing the difficulties in preparing for a DNA case); see also Roth, supra note 21, at 
1136 (stating that "[i]n any case involving a DNA match, no matter how the suspect was 
initially identified, the match is essentially meaningless without some sense of how unusual 
it is"). 
 249. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text (stating that DNA evidence could 
have a substantial impact on sentencing in states with broad sentencing ranges that give 
judges broad discretion). 
 250. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 82 (1986) (upholding the 
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circumstance, the burden of proof must meet a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.251  Some may argue that DNA can be admitted in any 
circumstance because Apprendi does not even apply to prior convictions.252  
It is true that the Court in Apprendi excludes prior convictions from its 
requirement of jury trial on any fact increasing the penalty for a crime 
beyond the statutory maximum.253  Almendarez-Torres v. United States,254 
explains that the goal of allowing prior conviction information at sentencing 
with very few boundaries stems from the continuing battle against 
recidivism.255  The Court has stuck with its 1912 decision that recidivism 
"does not relate to the commission of the offense, but goes to the 
punishment only, and therefore . . . may be subsequently decided."256  
However, DNA evidence is not necessarily evidence of a prior 
                                                                                                                 
challenged statute because it did not "authoriz[e] a sentence in excess of that otherwise 
allowed for [the underlying] offense"). 
 251. See discussion supra Part II (concluding that courts must meet a preponderance of 
the evidence standard if a DNA match to a previous unadjudicated crime is an additional fact 
used at sentencing that does not raise the statutory maximum). 
 252. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(emphasis added)). 
 253. See id. (stating that "any fact" that increases a criminal penalty must be submitted 
to a jury, except prior convictions). 
 254. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1998) (concluding 
that the challenged federal penalty provision in question did not define a separate crime and 
did not need to be included in the indictment).  In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a federal statute imposed a "separate crime or merely impose[d] an 
enhanced penalty."  Id. at 226.  The federal grand jury had indicted the defendant for 
violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326 because he was found in the United States after being deported.  
Id. at 227.  The defendant argued that the district court indictment did not mention his earlier 
conviction and as a result, he could not be punished more than "the maximum authorized for 
an offender without an earlier conviction."  Id.  Due to the statute’s grammatical 
construction, the court reasoned that Congress intended the statute to constitute a sentencing 
factor.  Id. at 229–35.  As a result, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that "the 
Constitution requires Congress to treat recidivism as an element of the offense" by 
distinguishing the present case from McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), chiefly 
because unlike McMillan, the statute in question did not "alter the maximum penalty for the 
crime."  Id. at 239–40.  Consequently, the Court "conclude[d] that the subsection is a penalty 
provision . . . .  It does not define a separate crime.  Consequently, neither the statute nor the 
Constitution require[s] the Government to charge the factor that it mentions, an earlier 
conviction, in the indictment."  Id. at 226–27. 
 255. See id. at 243 (listing statutory sentencing guidelines requiring a judge to consider 
an offender’s prior record in every case). 
 256. Id. at 244 (quoting Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 629 (1912)). 
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conviction.257  Prior convictions are on a defendant’s criminal record as a 
result of a jury trial finding beyond a reasonable doubt or a guilty plea.258  
"Cold hit" DNA evidence is not a conviction,259 and defendants need 
procedural safeguards against judicial abuse.260  The goal behind 
evidentiary rules of DNA admissibility—not punishing an innocent person 
for a crime he did not commit—still exists at sentencing.261  In turn, 
sentencing should not open the door for a judge to convict him of other 
crimes that have not been tried by a jury.262 
Rose Duffy, a scholar on judicial discretion, writes that, "not all of the 
Justices have given up on increased Sixth Amendment rights."263  Justice 
Scalia is the major proponent for increased Sixth Amendment rights at 
sentencing:  "‘[t]he door therefore remains open for a defendant to 
demonstrate that his sentence, whether inside or outside the advisory 
Guidelines range, would not have been upheld but for the existence of a fact 
found by the sentencing judge and not the jury.’"264  Similarly, Justice 
Souter promotes new mandatory guidelines in which "a jury finds every 
fact that is necessary to set the upper range of sentencing discretion."265 
IV.  Conclusion 
Not all constitutional rights vanish postconviction, and "courts have 
recognized an ever-increasing number of constitutional protections at 
                                                                                                                 
 257. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1140 (noting that DNA databases also contain mere 
arrestees in addition to convicted felons and misdemeanants). 
 258. See, e.g., 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 19 
(2010) ("The word ‘convicted’ in a repeat offender statute means the ascertainment of 
guilt by a plea or verdict." (internal citations omitted)). 
 259. See Roth, supra note 22, at 1140 (stating that DNA databases, which provide cold 
hit DNA evidence, contain both records of arrestees and individuals with prior convictions). 
 260. See generally Hessick & Hessick, supra note 33, at 86 (noting that "appellate 
courts tend to review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion" (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 261. See generally Malcom, supra note 17, at 338 (concluding that DNA evidence 
ought to be admissible in court but cautioning that "[t]he legal community should want and 
demand more evidence than mere testimony of a genetic match, riddled with the possibility 
of human error, before tarnishing a defendant with a conviction"). 
 262. See id. ("Our legal community should . . . require [in a conviction that DNA 
evidence have] some corroborating evidence to ensure the reliability of our justice system."). 
 263. Duffy, supra note 42, at 242. 
 264. See id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 60 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
 265. See id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 61 (Souter, J., concurring)). 
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sentencing relating to burdens of proof, the right to a jury, the right to 
remain silent, and the right to counsel."266  Courts, scholars and legislatures 
must keep this evolution in mind when determining the evidentiary standard 
of DNA admissibility at sentencing.267  DNA evidence is not infallible, and 
in light of Apprendi, a DNA database match should be viewed as an 
additional fact that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury if 
enhancing the punishment beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.268  
And in states with wide sentencing ranges, DNA evidence of an 
unadjudicated crime must meet at least a preponderance of the evidence 
burden of proof to assure a defendant’s right not to be sentenced with 
insufficient evidence.269  Such a requirement may include the use of 
witnesses to speak to its reliability and corroborating evidence.270 
                                                                                                                 
 266. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 33, at 76 (citing Carissa Byrne Hessick, 
Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1100–02 (2009)). 
 267. See discussion supra Part II (discussing changes in sentencing jurisprudence after 
Apprendi and the Court’s recognition that constitutional rights of defendants exist at 
sentencing). 
 268. See discussion supra Part II.B (examining the precedent available on using DNA 
evidence alone to convict and proposing that doing so requires an initial finding of a DNA 
random match probability of 1 in 1,000). 
 269. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the author’s opinion that DNA evidence of 
an unadjudicated crime must meet a preponderance of the evidence). 
 270. See Roth, supra note 21, at 1138–41 (explaining that at a criminal trial, the 
prosecution has expert witnesses assess the reliability of DNA evidence but the defense may 
cross-examine). 
